萨特有没有伦理学？

[摘要] 萨特是当代法国著名哲学家，他的哲学代表作《存在与虚无》最全面最完整地阐明了他的早期哲学思想。他曾萌生写一部伦理学著作的念头，并在此后的生涯中陆续写下许多伦理学的笔记。可是到头来，这部伦理学著作并未面世。这就引发了萨特的研究者对他到底有没有伦理学思想和对伦理学理论有没有特殊贡献的讨论。本文援引了西方哲学界的一些萨特学者对这一问题的看法，并发表了自己的观点。总的意见是：不能轻言萨特没有伦理学，我们可以依据散见于他的各种著作文章中的伦理学思想，建构起他的伦理学。本文还对萨特伦理学思想的特色作了分析。

[关键词] 萨特|伦理学|个人自由|社会自由 萨特没有出版他在《存在与虚无》一书末尾向世人宣告准备写的一部伦理学巨著，这是事实；可是， 他确实为写作这部著作作了大量的准备工作，写下了一大摞伦理学笔记，这也是事实。两件事实摆在一块儿，我们应该得出怎样的结论？萨特，归根结底，有没有他独特的伦理学理论？ 在西方哲学界，萨特的评论家和批评者对这个问题有着热烈的争论。萨特生前，无论成文的伦理学著作，还是大纲，仰或手稿都未见诸于世，所以争论集中在如下的问题上：假如萨特有时间写伦理学一书，他有无可能创建成体系的伦理学？根据萨特遗留的著作文章中的伦理学论述，构建他的伦理学有无可能？一些专家认为这种构建萨特伦理学的尝试是不可能的，这种不可能性来自萨特哲学本身内在的矛盾冲突。他们指出，萨特在《存在与虚无》中所持的本体论立场毁掉了他的伦理学的可能性；另一些学者则主张，要使萨特的伦理学有可能重建，必须彻底尘封他的早期思想，将这一伦理学建立在他的晚期著作的基础上；还有一些萨特研究者提出，从萨特遗留的著作文章看，萨特伦理学的大致轮廓还是依稀可辨的，因此有可能通过充实和细化，使这一轮廓变得清晰、明朗、丰满；最后一种观点则坚持，虽然萨特有许多引人入胜的关于伦理学的谈话、文章和笔记发表，但是，从总体上说，这些精彩的思想火花和灵感是零碎不全的，全面的分析和最后的归纳依然缺乏，不足以立起一座伦理学大厦。 以上大相径庭的观点可以概括为两个问题：第一，我们心目中的萨特伦理学，是否应建立在他在《存在与虚无》中所表述的本体论上？如果是，那么他早期的本体论认为人的本性是绝对自由的，这一观点同他后来的“人的自由受到社会条件的制约，因此人不是绝对自由的”观点相矛盾。关键的问题在于萨特后期保留还是放弃了他早期的本体论。如果萨特直到去世仍然抱着他的早期本体论观点舍不得放下，他的新伦理学就不可能诞生，否则，我们就得去探索作为他的新伦理学基础的新本体论。而萨特遗留的文稿表明，他并没有创立新的本体论。第二，根据散见于萨特所有的文章著作中的伦理学论述，能否足以形成萨特伦理学的理论体系？或者是，即使萨特有一些伦理学观点，它们也是零碎不全的，因此，系统的萨特伦理学是无法想象和建构起来的。 许多萨特的批评者认为萨特早期在《存在与虚无》中提出的本体论，阻碍了他形成有生命力的伦理学。只有彻底背弃这个本体论，拥抱另一个本体论，才能为他的伦理学奠定一个坚实的基础。由于我们没有见到萨特另一个系统的本体论，所以这使得萨特的伦理学不可能。 玛丽.沃呶克（MaryWarnock）、华特.欧岱尼克 (Walter Odajnyk) 和威尔福瑞德.迪僧 (Wilfrid Desan) 就是持这种观点的代表人物。然而，另一些人不同意这种观点。托马斯.安德生（Thomas C. Anderson）说：那些否定萨特本体论的批评者“有着对萨特本体论的误解”。他相信，“一旦萨特的本体论被正确地理解，虽然不是全部，但是许多困难能被解决…总而言之，更准确地说，作为萨特伦理学的真正基础，萨特早期的本体论对于他的伦理学的发展，不是一个很大的障碍。”安德生承认在出版《存在与虚无》之后的三十年内，萨特在许多方面修正了他的早期伦理学。然而，他没有指明“在那个时期，萨特的伦理观点有哪些本质变化。”萨特主要在20世纪40年代的著作中建立起来的伦理学“之大部仍然建立在他的早期本体论上”。 [1] 托马斯.布齐 (Thomas W. Busch) 说，在《萨特实录》电影中，米雪.康泰特（Michel Contat）问萨特有否审视过他大约三十卷著作，从中找出贯通这些著作的主线。萨特回答：是有一根主线，虽然他从未刻意去寻找，“哲学”就是绝无仅有的贯通所有不同著作的连接线。布齐说：“按照对‘哲学’的理解，自由应是贯通萨特全部著作的概念。” [2] 虽然在自由的问题上，萨特承认他的观点有很大的变化，他的话表明他仍然视他早期的自由理论为他的哲学思想，包括伦理学的核心思想，这一思想也贯穿他的晚期著作中的伦理学思想。同安德生一样，布齐也声称萨特早期哲学常常被误解：“萨特哲学，从一开始就被误解， 在《存在与虚无》出版四十五年后，它仍然被误解。”[3] 大卫.代特默 (David Detmer) 也认为萨特早期思想一直是，并且仍然是，许多方面被错误地解读。他坚定地相信“萨特的伦理学理论能够被发掘”，这一工作十分困难，因为它有必要“从散落在萨特全部著作中的有关伦理学的言论再造萨特的伦理学”。[4] 其他萨特学者，如琳达.贝尔（Linda A. Bell）和詹姆士.谢里丹(James F. Sheridan) 也著书立说为萨特早期哲学著作辩护。 我的研究表明萨特早期的自由观后来在许多方面被修正，举例说，他意识到人的自由与社会历史相联系，而社会历史条件往往与个人的自由相抵触。在二战期间，他经历了参加反纳粹，面临死亡威胁的战争，这种强加在他身上的责任不是他自由的选择。换言之，他承认在许多情况下，人是不自由的。 但因此认为萨特从那时起就抛弃了他早年的自由观是错误的，相反，在某种意义上他仍然坚持个人总是自由的的观点。在一次与西蒙.波伏瓦的谈话中，他明确表示：“我从未抛弃自由的观点，相反，我每一次行动，都感到自己是自由的。”[5] 这样，他一方面承认个人自由是有限度的；另一方面仍然保持个人总是有选择的自由的观点，甚至在做囚犯和死亡时也是这样。用他的话说：“如果明天这种或那种东西威胁到或阻碍到我的自由，死亡就成为保持我的自由的一种方法。”[6] 很明显，萨特在不同场合下讲的话之间存在着矛盾，这反映出他思想中的矛盾。然而，萨特从未彻底地批判或抛弃他的早期著作《存在与虚无》中的观点。他确实在实现了根本转变后批判了该书中的一些观点。但是，在他的晚年，他对早期著作《存在与虚无》和晚期著作《辩证理性批判》作比较时，并没有褒“后”贬“前”，在一次访谈中，波伏瓦问他是否认为《辩证理性批判》超越《存在与虚无》时，萨特回答：“我认为是如此，但我不应该情愿地这样说，因为从某种意义上说，我的早期著作在写作时就打上了满意的记号。对我来说认为《辩证理形批判真的高于《存在与虚无》是非常困难的。”为什么？因为“从某种意义上说，过去比未来更重要，它给了我们某样东西。”[7] 这儿萨特给了我们一个暗示，他并不认为早期哲学著作《存在与虚无》中的本体论思想，对形成和发展他的伦理学理论是一个不可逾越的障碍。 这就说明，“如果萨特没有丢弃他早期的本体论，就不会有萨特伦理学”的观点，是不是个合乎逻辑的推论？我承认，因为萨特没有找到一个令人满意的解决之道调和他的个人绝对自由和团体自由以及社会自由之间的矛盾，他对有生之年发表他的伦理学专著犹豫不决，但是，从他的许多作品，我们能够窥见他对伦理学思考的端倪和想要完成这本著作的心愿，因此我们有可能沿着他思想的路径，捡起他撒落的花瓣，走完他走到半途的路程。 对于第二个问题，根据萨特所有文章著作中涉及的伦理学观点，我们能否将它们归纳综合，形成系统的萨特伦理学，我的回答是既可能又有相当的难度。说“可能”是因为不可否认地，萨特留下了数量可观的关于伦理学的论述。战争日记（1939-1940）、存在与虚无（1943）、反犹太人和犹太教（1946）、存在主义是人道主义（1946）、唯物主义和革命（1946）、伦理学笔记（1947-1948）、方法论研究（1954）、辩证理性批判（1960）、伦理学笔记（1964-1965）就是其中的一些代表作。这些著作蕴含着丰富的对伦理学问题的思考，如个人自由问题、个人自由和社会自由的关系、自由与价值的关系、自由与选择、选择与责任、好信仰和坏信仰、 伦理与行动、武力与暴力、自在与自为等等问题。面对这么多有价值的思想材料，我们不能视而不见，武断地说复原萨特伦理学是不可能的事。 虽然萨特没有写出系统的伦理学著作，甚至没有提供一个伦理学著作的纲要，他的一些伦理学笔记是在他逝世后才出版的，但是我们能够从散布在他的著作、文章、笔记、访谈、日记、小说、戏剧、自传中收拢他有关伦理学的思想和见解，加以研究，探索这些思想中的内在逻辑，从而思考构建系统化的萨特伦理学的可能性。特别要指出的是，这种研究方法是萨特本人生前极力推崇的：“在我死后出版我的著作，我的论述将保持未完成和抽象状态，因为著作中的观点是未经充分发展的。这些不成熟的观点将由读者决定向什么方向发展。”[8] 然而我们必须同时对萨特伦理学可能性的困难有充分的认识， 最强硬的理由是萨特最终没有留给我们一部完整的或是部分完成的伦理学著作。他在有生之年曾经几度想要付诸行动，但是每一次不是推延就是搁置这个写作计划，我们必须正视这一事实。为此，我相信我们最终无法想象这部伦理学的模样。我在另一篇文章中说过，萨特在创建伦理学时遭逢一些理论困难，如个人自由和社会主义的之间的矛盾冲突，这使他驻足不前。这些未解决的理论问题对我们寻求构建萨特伦理学的目标来说，也是一个障碍，因为我们不知道萨特到底想怎样解决这些难题。还有，我们迄今所能查阅到的萨特关于伦理学的全部资料，仍然是残缺不全的：他在1945年至1949年间写下的许多伦理学笔记已经遗失，他在1964年至1965年间写的伦理学笔记没有出版。根据鲍勃.斯通和伊丽莎白.伯曼的考证：萨特有一千多页为到罗马和美国演讲写下的伦理学手稿，这些手稿仍未出版。这些材料对于研究萨特伦理学无疑是不可或缺的，因为它可能折射出萨特晚年伦理学思想的状态。正如萨特四十年代伦理学笔记从法文到英文的翻译者大卫.派洛尔（David Pellauer）所说：“任何冒险要呈上萨特伦理学的人必须接受犯错的可能性，至少在我们拥有所知道的相关材料以及其它不知道的文稿问世之前。”[9] 我们已经看到，萨特从未彻底抛弃他在早期著作中提出的人的自由的理论，但是他的确想从他的绝对个人自由的理论转到社会自由人的理论。他写下了许多新伦理学的文字材料，但是很不幸，我们无法看到这些材料之全部。 这就是研究萨特伦理学思想的学者所面对的现状。 根据这一状况，研究和再现萨特伦理学应当首先审度他的本体论，以便发现他的伦理学立足的基础。这就是，自由的理论，它是萨特伦理学的基石和主线；其次，探寻他在不同地方所涉及到的伦理学的重要观点，以便发现他的伦理学的重要思想和独特观点；再有，注重萨特“根本转变”后的伦理学思想，因为那是萨特真正想要阐述的他的新伦理学思想。 根据我对萨特著作文章所论及的伦理学思想的研究，我认为在萨特的脑海里，是有一个伦理学理论体系的考虑，这个体系可以包含几方面的问题：一是阐明自由如何是人的一切行动的基本条件。二是价值问题。论述价值和自由、价值和选择、以及选择和责任的关系。三是道德的理想境界是“真”的问题。其中有对“坏信仰”和“好信仰”的表现形式、要害实质的分析、达到“真”的境界和充分运用自由的关联。四是人际关系问题。如何从人与人之间原始的利害冲突的关系达到互助互利的关系。五是阐明自由是人类追求的最高价值和最终目标。这里有如何消灭自由的异化、如何实现人类的解放、实现人类解放所运用的暴力手段与道德的关系等等问题。由于篇幅限制，恕我在此无法详细展开。 在对萨特伦理学思想作了探索之后，我们能够对归根到底萨特有没有伦理学做出回答了。萨特确实留下许多有重要意义的和有独创性的伦理学的思想，这些思想是对伦理学的重要贡献。虽然他没有完成系统的伦理学著作，我们不能无视他的理论创造，武断地说没有萨特伦理学这回事。 以我之见，萨特伦理学最重要的观点、特点和贡献可以概括为以下几点： 人的自由理论是萨特伦理学全部理论的主线。萨特从本体论上揭示了人为什么和在本性上是自由的，以及怎样将自由作为人生最终奋斗目标。这是因为从本体论上说，人是自为的，即人的本性是有意识，所以人是虚无，不像万事万物，它们是自在的，即它们是存在，对于它们，我们能够说出它们是存在的和它们是什么。由于人是意识，意识不同于具体存在物，不是存在，他就不得不不断地制定奋斗目标和为实现目标的具体方法步骤，从而超越自身，达到自在自为。在实现自在自为的过程中，人不得不面临许多选择。他自由地在众多选择中选出其中之一。一旦他做出选择，他就要对自己所作的选择负责。价值和伦理道德就在人的选择过程中产生。无论他选择什么，不仅在这过程中产生道德和价值，而且直接同人的最终目标相联，这一最终目标就是达到最大限度的自由。人的一切活动体现着自由并且为了自由。自由是萨特伦理学的核心和灵魂。 萨特另一重要的伦理学观点是强调伦理道德规范是人创而不是神创。萨特摒弃了道德准则和人性是先验的、人的行为是上帝的决定的传统观点，大声疾呼，世上不存在先验的伦理道德，也不存在先天的人性和掌控人的行为的上帝。他挑战这样一个西方宗教伦理学的观点：“如果上帝死了，做任何事都将是允许的。”这个观点认为上帝给了人类道德准则和行为规范。他响亮地宣布：上帝没有颁布任何道德准则，是人类自己，创造了伦理道德。人自己决定他应该做什么，怎样做才是有价值，有意义的，因而是人创立了道德规范。虽然萨特的这一观点是大胆和叛逆的，但涉及到的伦理理论，仍引起许多争议，争议集中在萨特关于价值和自由、价值和选择的关系上，根据萨特所说，价值是人自由地选择的产物，比如如果人的每一次选择是有价值的和道德的，那末如何解释对谋杀的选择？毫无疑问没有人认为谋杀是正义的、有道德的。除此之外，如果每一个选择都是正确的，那将不可能使所选择的一件事比另一件事更有价值从而作更好的选择。 再有，如果所有的选择都是道德的，那就不会有不道德之事。但如果没有不道德之事，那末伦理学的必要性何在？再有，如果所有的价值都是从选择中产生的，我们如何阐明不是从选择中产生、而是人存在的基本模式、是人具有的选择可能性的前提的“自由”，具有最高的价值？ 这些问题对评论萨特关于价值判断的观点是十分关键的。如果他不能给出合理的回答，他的自由和价值的理论就站不住脚。我没有发现萨特对这些评论的答复，这也许因为他在构建伦理学的框架是没有想到这些问题，也许他相信自己能回答这些问题，但要等到在他要撰写结果落空的伦理学著作中回答，也许他觉得无法给与满意的答复，既然从未心甘情愿放弃他早期对自由的看法，因而选择留待后人去解决这一难题。所以，这儿我们发现对进一步探究萨特伦理学至关重要的观点：或者必须找到走出这些理论困境的出路，或者必须另辟蹊径，修正萨特的自由理论，这样，原有的理论难题将获得解决，或至少能满意地给予回答。 萨特另一重要的对伦理学的理论贡献是他提出了“坏信仰”的问题，如常见的说谎行为，这是伦理学探讨的问题之一。 但是萨特所探讨的是一个不同的问题：不是对他人说假话的问题，而是自我欺骗的问题。萨特对“坏信仰”问题有深入的研究，他揭示了“坏信仰”的本质是为达到个人的某种目的，对他人隐藏自己的真实性。处在“坏信仰”之下的人，将自己置身于虚幻的想象之中，并且把这种幻想当成现实。 虽然他清楚地知道真实的现实是怎样的，但是他不愿意承认和回到现实中来，宁可将自己的身心沉浸于幻想之中。萨特向我们说明，“坏信仰”在社会生活中是非常普遍的现象，它侵害了人的自由。“坏信仰”的存在，使人的自由被异化和受损害。萨特进一步指出，消除“坏信仰”是可能的，人们能通过追求“好信仰”的途径来杜绝“坏信仰”的产生。什么是“好信仰”？就是达到“真”，所谓“真”，就是以真实的、诚实的、可信的面貌对人对事，剥除任何伪装。萨特指出，有两条途径可以通向“真”的境界：一条是清晰地思考，另一条是富有责任心。这两条途径都要求我们待人处世，要坦然地、勇敢地面对现实，不要做“鸵鸟”，逃避现实，要勇于承担各种后果。有人会说，这些方法也许仍然太笼统，但至少向我们提供了一些原则。虽然我们能够抓住一些萨特对如何达到“真”的理解的话语和如何对“坏信仰”进行干预的具体方法，比如永远站在被压迫人民一边，但是总的来说，萨特没有详细阐明怎样运用这些原则。 萨特在伦理学方面有两项重大转变是值得一提的。一是他认识到人是社会的存在物，所以对人的自由的研究必须将其放进一定的社会和历史的环境之中方能进行，由此他将先前认为人是孤独无靠的、脱离社会群体和社会历史条件的观点和研究方法抛到九霄云外去了。当萨特认识到他以前犯的错误后，进而发现当一个社会存在压迫、贫穷和阶级斗争的情况下，人的自由被严重地损害和异化，因此认识到，为了恢复个人自由，被压迫者必须首先联合起来，用阶级的力量去实现社会的自由，个人自由只有在全体被压迫阶级被解放之后才能重新获得。 在第二次世界大战前，萨特提出纠正“坏信仰”的方法是个人的“自我防御”。他相信个人能够通过伦理道德的修身养性达到“真”的境界。然而二战后，他彻底放弃了这种通过所谓“个人灵魂拯救”来实现个人绝对自由的方法，转而接受个人自由的真正实现取决于社会全体人的自由实现的观点。 另一重要转变是他的主观际的理论。萨特早年想象人与人之间的关系在本质上总是冲突的，这是因为一方总要使另一方对象化，即从本体论上分析，每个人在与他人相处时，总会自觉或不自觉地视自己为主体，视对方为客体，反映在人际关系上，就是“他人是地狱”。在萨特眼里，人际关系是一幅冷酷和悲情的画面。然而，当萨特意识到人其实是社会性的存在物之后，他在人际关系中看到了互惠。之所以得出这个结论，是运用了一种新的思维方法，即把处在社会团体中的每个人都看成是“第三方”。在这种方法论指导下，每个人都发现自己是与他人相同的“同类”：既能是主体，又能是客体，还能是主体、客体之外的第三方。这是因为，作为第三方，他看其他人可以是主体也可以是客体。这样，人与人之间就没有区别，是平等的，没有人只是主子不是奴隶，也没有人只是奴隶不是主子。他由此得出结论，每个人在维护个人自由之外，都必须同时承认他人的自由。萨特在他的著名论著《辩证理性批判》中，深入地研究了团体自由、阶级自由和国家自由的问题。他对伦理学中的共同自由研究的成果是：个人自由必须植根于社会全体人自由的土壤之中才能根深叶茂。只有当社会共同自由提升到较高水平，个人自由才能随之得到升华。但是他的研究也有消极的成果。 萨特同时又认为，似乎共同自由发展的程度越高，对个人自由的限制也越多，就是说，共同自由的提升，会导致个人自由的下降。所以，一方面，离开共同自由，个人自由将无法生存；另一方面，从某种意义上说，个人自由与共同自由相矛盾、相抵牾。这是晚年萨特面临的理论上的困境。萨特一方面仍然不放弃早期的个人主义自由观，另方面他意识到共同自由的社会自由与个人自由同等重要。他必须找到一条整合这两种不同的自由的方法，然而萨特似乎没有能够圆满地解开这道难题。这就是为什么他在有生之年踌躇未完成和发表它的伦理学著作的原因。 我们在遗憾萨特没有写出他的伦理学著作之余，也要想想萨特说过的话：著作的未完成，是留给读者更广阔的空间去思考作者会怎样写下去或会写出什么来，这是件好事。就目前萨特伦理学的研究状况，根据他完成的著作中所表述过的观点去尝试构建萨特的伦理学，是我们肩负的使命。

Is There a Sartrean Ethics?

It is a fact that Sartre did not publish his work of ethics， which he made an announcement at the very end of his philosophical work Being and Nothingness. It is also a fact， however， Sartre had prepared a pile of notebooks for this ethics. Combining these two facts together， what conclusion should we make? Sartre， in the final analysis， is there his unique and creative ethical theory? There have been many heated debates on this question among commentators and critics of Sartre’s works throughout the world. Neither an ethics nor even a draft or an outline of such an ethics appeared in print during his lifetime. Hence much of these debates focused on questions such as: Is a Sartrean ethics possible， assuming he had time to write it? Is it possible to formulate his ethics from the works he has left us? Some scholars have maintained that such a project was inherently impossible because of internal difficulties within Sartre’s philosophy. They have claimed that the ontological positions of Being and Nothingness undermine its possibility. Others have held that a Sartrean ethics is possible， but only if one abandons his earlier position and bases this ethics on his later works. Still others have indicated the general outlines of an ethics that are discernible in Sartre’s works， arguing that these can be filled in in detail. A final position is that even though Sartre does have many interesting discussions， essays， and notes that relate to ethics， any overall synthesis is lacking and in the final analysis， unattainable. The above different opining can be reduced to two questions: First， is Sartre’s ethics， which we believe there is one， based on his ontology set forth in Being and Nothingness? If it is， his earlier ontological views maintain that human beings are absolutely free in nature. It would contradicts his later ethical view that human beings are not absolutely free， for his freedom is restricted by the society. The crucial point here is that whether Sartre had been kept or abandoned his earlier ontology in his later life. If Sartre had maintained his earlier ontology till the end of his life， his neo-ethics would not have possibly come into being. Otherwise， we have to find a new ontology for the foundation of this neo-ethics. Secondly， Are Sartre’s ethical points， supposedly there are， can be formed a sketch of Sartrean ethics， from all the literatures of Sartre? Or， even through Sartre did have some ethical points of view， they are mere bits and pieces. In general a systematic ethics is not imaginable and formable. Many of his critics have held that his early ontology as developed in Being and Nothingness prevented him from proposing a viable ethics that it is only by repudiating this ontology and embracing another that he could find a proper foundation for morality. Since Sartre does not have another ontological work， this opinion leads to the conclusion that Sartre’s ethics is impossible. Mary Warnock， Walter Odajnyk， and Wilfrid Desan are representatives of this position. However， many others have disagreed with such a view. Thomas C. Anderson declares that those critics who deny Sartre’s ontology are “rooted in misunderstandings of Sartre’s ontology.” He believes that “once the ontology is understood correctly， many， though not all， of these difficulties can be resolved…. It is more accurate to say that on balance Sartre’s early ontology is not so much an obstacle to the development of his ethics as it is its very foundation.” Anderson concedes that it is true that Sartre modified his early ontology in a number of areas in the thirty years after the publication of Being and Nothingness. However， he has not given any indication that “his moral positions have changed in essentials over that period.” The ethical theory， which was set forth primarily in works written in the 1940s， “remains for most part founded on the early ontology.”[1] Thomas W. Busch reports that in the film Sartre by Himself， Michel Contat asked Sartre if he ever looked back upon the approximately thirty volumes of his works in order to seize what unifying thread there is throughout them. Sartre replied that there was one even though he had never tried to look for it. “Philosophy” would be the only unity there among all the different books. Busch concludes: “In terms of philosophy it would appear that for Sartre freedom would be the obvious unifying concept.”[2] Although on that subject Sartre admitted that he had made considerable changes， his remarks prove that he still regarded his early theory as a part of the whole unifying thread that runs through his later works. Busch， like Anderson， also claims that Sartre’s early philosophy has often been misinterpreted: “Sartre’s philosophy has been， from the beginning， much misunderstood. Forth-five years after its publication Being and Nothingness is still misread.”[3] David Detmer also maintains that Sartre’s early thought has been， and still is， interpreted with many errors. He firmly holds “that a Sartrean ethical theory can be found.” Although the task is difficult， since “it becomes necessary to reconstruct Sartre’s theory from partial discussions which are scattered throughout his writing.” [4]Other scholars of Sartre， such as Linda A. Bell and James F. Sheridan have also published books that defend Sartre’s early philosophical works. My own research tells me that Sartre’s early view of freedom was modified in many ways in his later life. For example， he recognized that one’s freedom was related to the exterior world and history， which set them over against this freedom. During the war， he experienced that the obligation to go fight the Nazis and take part in a life and death struggle was something imposed upon him that he had not truly and freely desired nor chosen. In other words， he admitted that there were many circumstances in which one was not free. But it is wrong to think that Sartre had abandoned his early idea of inpidual freedom from then on. On the contrary， he still insisted in some way on the view that an inpidual is always free. He clearly stated in his interview with Simone de Beauvoir: “I never abandoned the idea of freedom. On the contrary， every time I acted I felt free.” [5]Thus， on the one hand， he acknowledged that there were some limitations on an inpidual’s freedom. On the other hand， he still retained the idea that one is always free to choose， even to remain a prisoner or to die. He says， “If tomorrow some threat or other menaces my freedom， death is a way of preserving it.” [6] Obviously there are some contradictions to be found in Sartre’s different remarks， which reflect a conflict in his thoughts. However， neither did Sartre ever completely repudiate or abandon his early philosophical work， Being and Nothingness. He did criticize the view presented in this work after his radical conversion following World War II. Nevertheless， he made the following comment in comparing Being and Nothingness and his later work， the Critique of Dialectical Reason， in his later years. In his interview with Beauvoir， she asked if he thought the Critique was better than Being and Nothingness. He replied: “I think that’s true， but I shouldn’t say so very willingly because in a way my earlier books are marked by the gratification I had when I was writing them. It’s very hard for me really to think of the Critique of Dialectical Reason as superior to Being and Nothingness.” Why? Because “in a way the past is more important than the future; it brings us something.”[7] Here Sartre provides us a hint that he thought that his early philosophical works， especially Being and Nothingness， are not an obstacle for developing his ethics at all. Is it a logical argument that if Sartre did not abandon his earlier ontology， there would not have been Sartean ethics? Not really. I admit that because Sartre was not able to find a satisfactory way to reconcile his inpidual absolute freedom with group freedom and social liberty， he hesitated to bring about his work of ethics in his lifetime. But obviously， from many of his writings， we can see his thinking on this issue and his attempt to solve the problem. We can go after his thoughts， study what he had achieved to retrieve an ethics as his one in the middle way. Towards the second question， my answer is both “yes” and “no”. The reason I give a positive answer is that it is an undeniable fact that Sartre handed down a considerable quantity of writing on ethics. The War Diaries (1939-1940)， Being and Nothingness (1943)， Anti-Semite and Jew (1946)， “Existentialism is a Humanism”(1946)， “Materialism and Revolution” (1946)， Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-1948)， Search for a Method (1954)， Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960)， and “Notes on Ethics” (1964-1965) are representative examples. These works contain rich and detailed discussions of topics having to do with ethics， such as inpidual freedom， personal freedom and social liberty， freedom and value， life and choice， choice and responsibility， authenticity and bad faith， the importance of actions to ethics， force and violence， to be in-itself-for-itself， etc. Confronted with so many valuable materials， we cannot simply assert that Sartre’s ethics is impossible. Although Sartre failed to finish and publish a systematic work of ethics， and he did not even offer an outline of his ethics during his lifetime， his notebooks scattered in his works， essays， notebooks， interviews， diaries， novels， drama， and biographies， which relate to his ideas regarding ethics. Gather them， study them， and seek to find an internal logic， from which consider the possibilities of a systematic ethics of Sartre. This method was highly recommended by Sartre himself: “Published after my death， these texts will remain unfinished and obscure， since they formulate ideas which are not completely developed. It will be up to the reader to decide where they might have led me.”[8] Yet we must also pass a negative judgment on the possibility of Sartre’s ethics. The reason I also give a negative answer is that ultimately Sartre himself did not provide us with a work of ethics. He intended to write it up several times in his lifetime， but he postponed it or gave it up every time. We have to take this fact seriously. Because of it， I believe， finally we are unable to conceive what this ethics would be. As I said in another article: Sartre had difficulties in resolving certain theoretical problems in his ethics， such as the relation between socialism and liberty， which stopped him from completing it. These unsolved problems are also an obstacle for us if we seek to complete and develop Sartre’s ethics， since we have no idea what Sartre himself might have suggested as a solution. We must add that， for all the material we have， these sources of Sartre’s writings on ethics are also very limited. Many of the notebooks he wrote between 1945 and 1949 have disappeared， and his notes on ethics written in 1964-1965 are still unpublished. According to Bob Stone and Elizabeth Bowman， more than a thousand pages of manuscripts were prepared for lectures Sartre was to give in Rome and in the United States， but this material remains unpublished. This material is obviously necessary for a study of Sartre’s ethics， for it reflects what his dialectical ethics and the latest version of ethics would have become. As David Pellauer， the translator of Sartre’s Notebooks for an Ethics says， “anyone venturing to present ‘Sartre’s ethics’ must accept the possibility of being proved mistaken， at least until we have all of this material and whatever other writings may yet appear.”[9] As we have seen， Sartre never completely abandoned the theory of human freedom raised in his early works， but he did want to move from his theory of purely inpidual freedom to one of the free people living in the society. He wrote down many literatures to develop the dialectical ethics， but unfortunately we are unable to read all of them. This is the current situation that scholars who wish to examine Sartre’s ethical thoughts must confront with and accept. Based on this premise， to examine and retrieve Sartre’s ethics should first go through his ontology， in order to find the foundation on which his ethics is built upon. That is， the theory of freedom， which is the basis and the unifying thread of his ethics. Next， search for the essential issues of ethics he discussed in various places to find out the main ideas and distinctive points of his ethics. Moreover， pay more attention on ethical discussions after his radical conversion， because those are the points Sartre really wanted to expound as his neo-ethics. Having completed my inquiry into what Sartre has to say about ethics， we can get the answer whether there is finally a Sartrean ethics. Sartre indeed leaves us many significant and creative reflections on ethics， which are his obvious contribution to the theory of ethics. Even though he did not accomplish a systematic ethics， we cannot disregard what he brought about and say that there is no such a thing as Sartre’s ethics. The most significant points and characteristics of Sartean ethics， in my view， are as follows: Human freedom is the unifying thread of Sartre’s entire ethical theories. Sartre explains from ontology why and how man is originally free and how he sets freedom as his ultimate goal. This is because man is a being for-itself， he is a consciousness in nature， so that he is actually nothingness， contrasted to the things in the world-being in-itself， which itself is founded upon being about which we can only say that it is and is what it is. Since man lacks being， he constantly makes projects in order to transcend himself toward the in-itself. During the course of attempting to become a being in-itself-for-itself， man must deal with various choices. He is free to choose any one among many and he is responsible for what he does choose. Values and morality are brought forth in this process of choosing. Whatever he chooses， it not only makes moral value upsurge， but also is directed toward man’s ultimate end—the maximum freedom. All human activities are and for the matter of freedom. Freedom is the soul of Sartre’s ethics. Without it， Sartre’s ethics would not be established. Another important point is that Sartre emphasizes the power of man in morality. Sartre rejects all traditional views pertaining to a priori moral rules， human nature， and God’s role in relation to human behavior. He firmly and bravely states that there is no a priori morality， including a given nature and God， to control human activities. At the same time， he challenges the view that “if God is dead， everything is permitted.” He announces loudly that God provides us nothing in morality. He says， it is up to man， to human beings， to create morality. Man makes a decision by himself about what he should do， so it is man who makes things valuable， meaningful and therefore creates moral laws. Although Sartre’s view is fresh and new， it has caused many debates. Many tough questions have been raised regarding what Sartre says about values being the product of man’s freedom and his lack of being， such as if it is the case that every choice is valuable and moral， how to explain a choice of murdering? Obviously no one would think killing is just. In addition， if every choice is right， it would not be possible to weigh one thing as more valuable than another and to choose a better one. Moreover， if it were the case that all choices are moral， there would be no immorality. But if there is no immorality， what’s the necessity of ethics? Furthermore， if all value are derived from choices， how can we also show that freedom is the highest value since freedom is not derived from choices but it is a consequence of man’s mode of being which makes choosing possible. These questions are central to any evaluation of the adequacy of Sartre’s position regarding the subjectivity of all value judgments. If he cannot offer a reasonable answer to them， his point cannot stand. I have not been able to find anything that would indicate Sartre’s own response to these criticisms. Perhaps he did not anticipate such questions when he was formulating the basic framework of his ethics. Or maybe he was confident that he could respond to them， but he planned to do so in the volume on ethics that was never completed and never published. It might also be possible that he was unable to find a satisfactory answer and so chose to leave it as a problem for people after him to resolve， since it is evident from what we have seen that he never was willing to give up his early position concerning the proper understanding of human freedom. Therefore， we find here one crucial point for any further investigation into Sartre’s ethics. Either one must find a way to answer these difficult questions， it would seem， or one must begin again finding a way to revise Sartre’s analysis of freedom in such a way that such questions do not arise， or at least can be answered satisfactorily. The other significant contribution of Sartre in ethics is that he raises the issue of bad faith. As we often see， lying is frequently discussed in ethics. But what Sartre probes is a different issue. It is not the issue of lying to others; rather， it is the problem of self-deceit. Sartre made a profound research into such bad faith. He reveals that he nature of bad faith is to cover up one’s true being to others for one’s own purpose. The person in bad faith sets himself in a false imagination and regards it as reality. Although he knows clearly about what the actual reality is， he is not willing to recognize it. He would rather indulge his mind and body in illusions. Sartre shows us that bad faith is a very common phenomenon in human society. It is harmful to human freedom. Human freedom would be alienated and ruined if bad faith remains. To solve the problem of bad faith is possible， according to Sartre， however. Man can look for good faith. In other words， to be authentic. There are two ways to reach authenticity: to think lucidly and to be responsible. The former asks us not to elude reality. The latter tells us we must bravely deal with reality as we find it. These methods are perhaps still too general， some will say. Well， at least they provide some hints to us. Sartre did not have the chance to expound details of how he would apply these guidelines， although we can grasp something of how he understood them in his own concrete interventions in the events of his day， i.e.， to always try to be on the side of the oppressed. There are two great changes in Sartrean ethical view. One is that since he became more aware that man was a social being， human freedom must be studied in the context of its historical and social environment. He therefore set aside the idea and the method he adapted before that man was alone and could be understood in isolation from other people and his social conditions. As Sartre recognized his mistake， he found that man’s freedom was badly spoiled and alienated under the situation of oppression， poverty， and the class war. He thereby recognized that in order to restore an inpidual’s freedom， the oppressed had to unite and employ class force to seek social liberty first. Inpidual freedom could be seized back only of the whole oppressed class got liberated. This is a significant change. Before the end of the Second World War the method Sartre offered to treat bad faith was one of “self-recovery.” He believed that inpiduals could seek authenticity through a self-training in ethics. Yet after the war he totally gave up this view of the way to salvation. He turned his view to one where inpidual freedom could not truly exist unless freedom for all existed. The other important change is his theory of intersubjectivity. In the earlier time， Sartre had conceived that the relationship between inpiduals was always one of conflict， for one side is always going to objectify the other side. The picture of human relations drawn by Sartre was cruel and pessimistic. Nonetheless， when Sartre discovered man was social， he found reciprocity in human relations. The method he adapted was to think each person in a group as “a third.” In this way， everyone discovers that he is the “same” as others， for he can be a subject， an object， and the third person who watches others as a subject and as an object as well. And since there is no difference between each inpidual， everybody is equal to one anther. No one is ever a slave. It follows that there is a mutual recognition of freedom among different inpiduals. Sartre studied more closely the freedom in groups， in classes， and in nations in his well-known work， The Critique of Dialectical Reason. The result of his study of such mutual freedom for his ethics is the recognition that inpidual freedom has to be rooted in the soil of freedom for all. And inpidual freedom will be raised to a higher level when common freedom rises to a higher degree. But the result has a negative side， too. For it seems that the higher level common freedom develops to， the more restrictions land on inpidual freedom. This means that inpidual freedom will decrease when common freedom increases. So on the one hand， inpidual freedom cannot survive alone without common freedom; on the other hand， inpidual freedom is contradictory to common freedom to some extent. This is the dilemma the later Sartre confronted. On the one hand， we know that he still insisted on his early stand in favor of inpidual freedom; on the other hand， he came to understand that common freedom and social liberty are equally important. He has to find a way to integrate these two freedoms. It seems to me that Sartre did not solve this dilemma satisfactorily. That is why he hesitated to complete or to publish his work on ethics in his lifetime. Nevertheless， as Sartre said， it is good to leave a work unfinished and to leave room for readers to think about what might follow or what might have been. It is our task to try to finish Sartre’s ethics by trying to think beyond what he did say on the basis of what he did accomplish. Abstract: That is there a Sartre’s ethics is a heated debate in western philosophical society. This is because it’s true that Sartre made an announcement to write an ethical work right after his well known philosophical work ， but that work had never come into being. It is also true that Sartre wrote down many notebooks on ethics. And he had some unique and creative ethical thoughts spread in many of his discourses， essays， and philosophical works. From these facts， how do we conclude if Sartre really has his own ethical theory? This article introduces some different opining on this issue among western scholars and is going to present an answer to this question through an analysis. Key words: Sartre Ethics Earlier Ontology About Author: ji Ruman was teaching in the Philosophy Department of Fudan University from 1973 to 1985. She went to the USA to study western philosophy and obtained MA and PhD degrees in philosophy. She is a vice chairman of Basic Education Department in Shanghai Industrial and Commercial Foreign Language Institute at Present. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Thomas C. Anderson: The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics， P.6. [2] Thomas W. Busch: The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstance in Sartre’s Philosophy， Bloomington: Indiana University Press， 1990， P.xi. [3] Ibid.， P.xiii. [4] David Detmer: Freedom as Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre， Lasalle， IL: Open Court， 1986， P. 2. [5] Simone de Beauvoir， Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre， trans， Patrick O’Brian (New York: Pantheon， 1984) 25. [6] Beauvoir， 21. [7] Beauvoir， 26. [8] 萨特：七十自述，出自生活/形势，译者：Paul Auster and Lydia Davis， 纽约：Pantheon， 1977， 第74-75页。 [9] 萨特：伦理学笔记，译者：David Pellauer， 芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1992，第viii页。 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Thomas C. Anderson， The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics (The Regents Press of Kansas， 1979) 6. [2] Thomas W. Busch， The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstance in Sartre’s Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press， 1990) xi. [3] Busch xiii. [4] David Detmer， Freedom as Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre (Lasalle， IL: Open Court， 1986) 2. [5] Simone de Beauvoir， Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre， trans. Patrick O’Brian (New York: Pantheon， 1984) 25. [6] Beauvoir 21. [7] Beauvoir 26. [8] Sartre， “Self-Portrait at Seventy”， in Life/Situations ， trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon， 1977) 74-75. [9] Sartre， Notebooks for an Ethics ， trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press， 1992) viii.